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PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LOCUS OF CONSTITUENT POWER IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The majority Supreme Court judgment in Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union quotes with approval AV Dicey’s famous assertion that the United 
Kingdom (UK) is ‘the most flexible polity in existence.’1 In finding that an Act of 
Parliament was required to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union and 
commence withdrawal from the European Union (EU), Miller could be read as another 
example of the UK Constitution’s ability to adapt to new challenges.2 This article takes 
issue with this reading of the UK Constitution, arguing instead that parliamentary 
sovereignty’s assimilation of constituent power—the ultimate power in a legal order 
to create and posit a constitution— has stultified the development of UK constitutional 
law. The result is a deeply ideological, as distinct from oft-heralded pragmatic, 
constitutional structure incapable of confronting systemic challenges. Consequently, 
this article contends that by conceptualising a more antagonistic relation between the 
Crown-in-Parliament and ‘the people’ through acknowledging  the anti-democratic 
basis of the former’s possession of constituent power, the UK constitutional order can 
be re-invigorated, parliamentary hubris tempered, and many of the constitutional 
challenges addressed. This re-appraisal also requires interrogation of the notion of ‘the 
people’ in the UK constitutional order itself. 
 
Part I of this paper analyses the extant constitutional ‘torpor’ in the UK, arguing that 
despite what appear to be substantial constitutional reforms in recent decades, the 
persistent preservation of parliamentary sovereignty is inhibiting deeper 
constitutional restructuring. The result is a constitutional law in ‘crisis’ and, it is 
contended, in need of a paradigmatic revolution. Part II then introduces the concept 
of constituent power and questions the assumption made by much of the literature 
that constituent power is exclusively vested in the people. A descriptive as distinct 
from normative account of constituent power is instead advanced in order to provide 
a more critical lens through which constitutional orders can be assessed. This, in turn, 
paves the way for a distinction to be drawn between the possessor of constituent 
power in a constitutional order and the people. Part III then analyses constituent 
power in the context of the UK, arguing that the idea of parliamentary sovereignty 
shares many features with constituent power. However, this does not mean that 
constituent power is vested in the British people; rather, the locus of constituent power 
in the UK should be more forcefully critiqued from a democratic perspective and its 
monarchical or aristocratic/oligarchical bases exposed. By acknowledging this 
distinction between the people and the locus of constituent power in the UK, Part IV 
argues that the sacrosanctity of parliamentary sovereignty can be broached and more 
                                                 
1 [2017] UKSC 5 [40] quoting AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed 1915) 
87. 
2 Alison Young thus suggests that ‘history may merely regard it [Brexit] as a blip in the ever-evolving 
nature of the UK’s famously flexible uncodified constitution. See Alison Young, ‘Will Brexit change the 
UK Constitution?’ Hansard Society (7 August 2018) https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/will-
brexit-change-the-uk-constitution accessed 23 August 2018.  
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effective constitutional reform can follow by embracing this tension between 
parliament and the people. These reforms may entail limiting the sovereignty of the 
Westminster Parliament in favour of empowering the devolved institutions or 
recognising the emergence of ‘the people’ or ‘peoples’ as constitutional authorities. 
Rather than inhibiting constitutional flexibility, such changes can provide the 
necessary points of contestation in a constitutional order, acting as fulcra around 
which democratic change can be levered.  
 
1. THE UK’S CONSTITUTIONAL TORPOR 
Amidst the throes of great instability would not ostensibly be the best time to claim 
that the UK is in a state of constitutional torpor. This claim makes sense, however, if 
constitutional tumult is symptomatic of this accidie. Neil Walker, writing in 2014 
referred to the contemporary constitutional phase of the UK as ‘our constitutional 
unsettlement.’3 Walker was primarily focused on the impact of devolution, with the 
impending 2014 referendum on Scottish independence featuring prominently. Walker 
attributes much of this unsettlement to the constitutional reforms enacted by the New 
Labour government which came to power in 1997 and ushered in the era of 
devolution.4 The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the concurrent growth in judicial 
power, and the continuing expanding influence of the EU on the constitutional 
landscape also combined to ‘make the constitution more multipolar in its sources of 
authority and less institutionally concentrated.’5 Analyses of these various changes 
during this period were often framed as the UK transitioning from a political to a legal 
constitution,6 leading to a renewed focus on this apparent growth of judicial power.7 
None of these reforms— either individually or combined— have, however, mounted 
an insurmountable challenge to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in 
mainstream constitutional theory. This is not to say that parliamentary sovereignty 
has not been tested or even modified to a degree; rather, it is the case that the 
challenges to date have not fully dislodged this principle. Indeed, these changes have 
resulted in more nuanced theories of parliamentary sovereignty accompanied by 
deeper normative defences of the principle and the UK constitution as a whole.8 This 
may, of course, be interpreted as corroborating the robustness and flexibility of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the UK constitution; however, the opposite case shall 
be made here. 
 
                                                 
3 Neil Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529. 
4 ibid 535 
5 ibid 536. 
6 Aileen McHarg, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, Convention, Soft Law’ (2008) 
71(6) Modern Law Review 853,853. 
7 See, for example, The Judicial Power Project whose stated aims are ‘to understand and correct the 
undue rise in judicial power by restating, for modern times and in relation to modern problems, the 
nature and limits of the judicial power within our tradition and the related scope of sound legislative 
and executive authority.’ ‘About the Judicial Power Project’ The Judicial Power Project < 
http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/about/> accessed 14 August 2018. 
8 See, for example, Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2005); Richard 
Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Graham Gee and Grégoire CN Webber, ‘What is a political constitution?’ (2010) 
30(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273. 
3 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty: The Inviolable Constitutional Norm 
The simple claim that Parliament may legislate as it sees fit belies a number of 
complexities. To say that Parliament may make or unmake any law it wishes 
necessarily implies that one parliament cannot bind a future parliament.9 This raises 
the paradox of a constraint on Parliament’s law-making ability in order to ensure its 
‘continuing sovereignty’. This ‘positive’ dimension of Parliament’s omnipotence also 
requires what Dicey terms a negative dimension: that no institution is capable of 
declaring an Act of Parliament unconstitutional.10 The principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty thus stands as the apex norm of the British constitutional order and 
shapes the functions, not only of Parliament, but of all other constitutional institutions 
also.  
 
It is this relation between Parliament and the other branches of government that the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty is primarily oriented towards. This has been 
the case since the establishment of the primacy of Parliament when sovereignty was 
wrested from the Crown in the muddled aftermath of the English Civil War, thus 
amounting to a claim of authority over the monarch. While the Monarch is still 
recognised in the statement that ‘whatever the Queen-in-Parliament enacts as a statute 
is law,’ the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Act of Settlement 1701 make it clear that the 
superior constitutional authority is located in Westminster Palace rather than 
Buckingham Palace.11 Prerogative powers—residual powers of the Crown with no 
basis in statute— have also been tamed with legislation firmly established as a 
superior source of law.12 Dicey’s formulation of parliamentary sovereignty, however, 
was primarily concerned, not with the relation between Parliament and the Crown 
but between Parliament and the courts.13 Parliamentary sovereignty thus injuncts the 
courts against finding a parliamentary statute invalid on the basis that Parliament 
acted ultra vires its constitutional mandate.14  
 
Whether Dicey’s formulation of parliamentary sovereignty has survived since the 
early Twentieth Century is a matter of considerable debate. The aforementioned 
challenges to parliamentary sovereignty in the form of UK membership of the EU, 
devolution, and the perceived trend towards legal constitutionalism have resulted in 
the need to re-appraise parliamentary sovereignty. That stated, the challenge to 
Dicey’s formulation can be traced back further than this to the fraught question of 
Irish home rule and Dicey’s own vehement opposition to it.15 The blocking of home 
rule legislation by the House of Lords resulted in a showdown between the upper 
                                                 
9 Dicey (n 1) 3-4. 
10 ibid 
11 Roger Masterman and Colin Murray, Exploring Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson, 2013) 
116-117; Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003) 44. 
12 Bill of Rights 1689. 
13 This institutionally-oriented aspect of parliamentary sovereignty is illustrated by TRS Allan’s claim 
that, ‘Parliament is sovereign because the judges acknowledge its legal and political supremacy’. TRS 
Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Clarendon Press 1993) 
10.  
14 Dicey (n 9). 
15 See AV Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule (Richmond Publishing 1973).  
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house and the Commons in a situation where the Irish Nationalists held the balance 
of power. The result was an alteration in how Parliament could enact legislation 
through the diminution of the power of the House of Lords,—a change that was 
ultimately upheld in Jackson v Attorney General over 90 years later.16 This clearly 
affected future parliaments’ law-making power; consequently, it has been suggested 
that parliamentary sovereignty is now ‘self-embracing’— that Parliament possesses 
the power to change the law affecting itself, including the scope of its law-making 
power. The theory of parliamentary sovereignty has thus adapted to recognise the fact 
that one Parliament can limit or alter the processes through which Parliament 
exercises its unlimited law-making power; however, it cannot place limits on the 
substantive content of such laws.17  
 
The viability of this distinction between formal and substantial limitations on 
Parliament’s law-making power has, however, been criticised, most notably by 
Nicholas Barber who argues that if Parliament can limit itself formally, it could amend 
these formal rules to such an extent that it could, in essence, make it impossible to 
enact certain substantive changes; for example, requiring  ‘unanimous support of the 
population in a referendum—a more complicated way of achieving the exact same 
end.’18 Barber thus contends that parliamentary sovereignty ‘ceased to be a feature of 
the United Kingdom’s constitution in 1991’ when the House of Lords in Factortame 
No.2 set aside the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 for conflicting with the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA).19 Barber’s analysis echoes William Wade’s contention 
that Factortame constituted a ‘constitutional revolution’ as the 1972 Parliament had 
succeeded in binding the 1988 Parliament— something previously thought 
impossible.20 Despite Lord Bridge basing his judgment on parliamentary intention by 
contending that Parliament’s acknowledgment of the supremacy of European law was 
‘entirely voluntary’, Factortame, nevertheless is an example of a past Parliament 
binding a future parliament. Barber’s and Wade’s analysis of Factortame thus poses a 
profound challenge to Parliament’s continuing sovereignty and parliamentary 
sovereignty itself; however, the predominant position in the literature, and the 
responses provoked by Wade and Walker appears to be modification of the theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty away from Dicey’s conception, rather than revolution of 
the paradigm completely.21 The UK’s decision to leave the EU (Brexit), has to an 
extent, further corroborated the predominant position by demonstrating Parliament’s 
authority to repeal the ECA and show that Parliament’s continuing sovereignty has 
not yet been curtailed, notwithstanding the possibility that this could occur.  
 
Devolution, parliamentary sovereignty and the People 
                                                 
16 Parliament Act 1911 and subsequently, the Parliament Act 1949. 
17 See Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; Michael Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK 
Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart Publishing, 2015) Ch2.  
18 Ibid 148. 
19 NW Barber, ‘The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2011) 9(1) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 144, 144.  
20 HWR Wade, ‘Sovereignty— Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 568, 568. 
21 See text from n 148 to n 157 below. 
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The ill-fated Irish home rule acts, the subsequent Irish War of Independence, and 
partitioning of Ireland and establishment of a Northern Ireland Parliament illustrates 
that devolution should not be conceptualised as a wholly recent innovation.22 
Nevertheless, the period of devolution ushered in at the end of the Twentieth Century 
presented its own challenges to parliamentary sovereignty. While Parliament could 
always point to its superior democratic credentials vis-à-vis the Crown or the courts, 
the same could not be said with regards to the devolved institutions, all of which have 
a direct democratic mandate from the people in their respective parts of the UK. The 
devolution statutes themselves also have enhanced democratic credentials beyond 
Parliament, with each devolved region ratifying the move to devolution through a 
referendum.23 In particular, the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly was 
not simply endorsed by the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum but also, 
concurrently, by a referendum and constitutional amendment in the Republic of 
Ireland.24 Devolution therefore is an attempt to recognise the heterogeneous or 
plurinational dimension to the UK polity while simultaneously preserving the unitary 
nature of the UK constitutional order and British demos demanded by parliamentary 
sovereignty.25 This tentative balancing act is particularly pronounced in the context of 
Northern Ireland wherethe question of whether there is or ever was a unitary British 
demos to begin with is inherently problematic to say the least.26  
 
Despite recognising a heterogeneous demos, the unitary, as distinct from federal, 
status of the UK still endures with devolution maintaining parliamentary sovereignty 
through what has been termed a ‘triple lock’.27 Firstly, devolved institutions are 
empowered to amend or repeal primary legislation but only within the jurisdiction in 
question and only within the ambit of the powers conferred upon them. Courts are 
therefore empowered to invalidate legislation passed by the devolved institutions 
should the act ultra vires.28 Secondly, the devolution statutes are highly technical in 
their wording, shorn of lofty constitutional rhetoric, empowering more regionally 
based decision-making without undermining the unitary basis of the UK.29  Only with 
regards to Northern Ireland is the prospect of future independence from the UK 
countenanced; however, this was the case since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.30  
Thirdly, the devolved powers can be traced back to the respective devolution statutes 
and so can be conceptualised as an expression of, rather than antagonistic to, 
                                                 
22 Government of Ireland Act 1920. 
23 Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997; Northern Ireland Office, ‘The Belfast Agreement’ (10 
April 1998)  25  < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement> accessed 7 
September 2018. 
24 The Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1998. 
25 See Stephen Tierney, ‘Giving with one hand: Scottish devolution within a unitary state’ (2007) 5(4) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 730. 
26 To reflect this, the Good Friday Agreement allows citizens of Northern Ireland to choose their 
citizenship. They may be Irish, or British or both. ‘The Belfast Agreement’ (n 23) 4 [vi]; Sylvia de Mars, 
Colin Murray, Aoife O’ Donoghue and Ben Warwick, Bordering Two Unions: Northern Ireland and Brexit 
(Policy Press, 2018) Ch 4. 
27 Rodney Brazier, ‘The Constitution of a United Kingdom’ (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 96, 102. 
28 s29 Scotland Act 1998. 
29 Brazier (n27) 103; Masterman and Murray (n 11) 368. 
30 Brazier ibid 100. 
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parliamentary sovereignty.31 Westminster’s right to legislate in the area of devolved 
competences is also preserved with devolution striving to avoid a strict separation of 
competences between central and devolved institutions.32 Faith is instead placed in 
constitutional conventions or what Aileen McHarg has described as soft law in order 
to regulate this relation between Westminster and the devolved institutions.33 The so-
called Sewel convention thus provides that Westminster will not ordinarily legislate 
in an area of devolved competence without the prior permission of the devolved 
institutions.34 This reliance on soft law has resulted in Mark Elliott distinguishing 
between legal and constitutional restrictions on parliamentary sovereignty, arguing 
that while devolution has not limited parliamentary sovereignty from a legal 
perspective, it has clearly had an impact constitutionally and has managed to ‘conjure 
into life a constitutional principle—devolved autonomy— whose fundamentality is 
increasingly difficult to dispute’.35 Elliott’s analysis thus implicitly endorses the view 
of the UK constitution as a flexible, pragmatic entity capable of creating new principles 
and conventions that respond to the demands of the age without the need to resort to 
legal codifications and the limiting of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Brexit, however, has demonstrated the fragility of this ‘fundamental’ constitutional 
principle of devolved autonomy. In Miller, on the question of whether the approval of 
the devolved institutions was required before Article 50 could be triggered, the 
majority judgment delivered a master-class in judicial restraint and constitutional 
conservativism. Although the Sewel convention was placed on a statutory basis in 
2016 following the unsuccessful Scottish independence referendum,36 the Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that it legally constrained the sovereignty of Westminster, 
upholding the orthodox position that courts could recognise the existence of a 
convention but could not enforce it.37 This re-affirmation of constitutional orthodoxy, 
however, rather than settling the question has only resulted in further agitation from 
the devolved institutions, most notably in Scotland and has only served to illustrate 
the challenges posed to parliamentary sovereignty by devolution.38 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid 102-103. 
32 S 28(7) Scotland Act 1998. 
33 See Aileen McHarg, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, Convention, Soft Law’ (2008) 
71(6) Modern Law Review 853. 
34The Sewell Convention is named after Lord Sewel who first proposed the convention during a 
parliamentary debate on s28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. HL Debs vol. 592, col 791 (21 July 1998). 
35 Mark Elliott, ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Legal, Constitutional, and Political 
Perspective’ in Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver, and Colm Ó Cinnéide, The Changing Constitution (8th ed 
OUP, 2015) 38, 42-3. 
36 S2 Scotland Act 2016. 
37 Miller (n 1) [149]-[151]. 
38 Perhaps the most striking example of this at the time of writing was the walkout on 14 June 2018 by 
SNP MPs during the debate on the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. See   Ann Perkins, ‘SNP Promises more 
guerrilla tactics over Brexit powers’ The Guardian (14 June 2018) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/14/snp-promises-more-guerrilla-tactics-over-
brexit-powers> accessed 7 September 2018; ‘Nicola Sturgeon says she is proud of SNP MPs’ Commons 
walkout’ BBC News (13 June 2018) < https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-44474429> accessed 7 
September 2018. 
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All judges in Miller also reaffirmed orthodox constitutional position regarding the 
legal status of the referendum itself. The European Union Referendum Act 2015 which 
enabled and regulated the holding of the Brexit referendum was advisory in nature 
and non-binding on Parliament.39 This finding was entirely unsurprising and, indeed, 
anything to the contrary would have amounted to no less than the uprooting of 
parliamentary sovereignty. However, to leave the question of the referendum and its 
impact on parliamentary sovereignty at that would constitute an over-simplistic 
analysis of the relation between Parliament and the ‘will of the people’ as expressed 
in a referendum. Certainly, the referendum was not legally binding; however, the 
political legitimacy it conferred upon Brexit was of such a degree that it compelled 
many ‘Remainer’ MPs who campaigned against the UK leaving the EU to, 
nevertheless, vote in favour of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 
2017, conferring the power to trigger Article 50 on the Prime Minister.40 As the Brexit 
process continued, however, the relationship between the executive and Parliament 
experienced an unprecedented rupture,  with the Government, at the time of writing, 
unable to pass its proposed withdrawal agreement it negotiated with the EU. Again, 
the ‘will of the people’ was invoked by various sides of this dispute.41 An appeal to 
the ‘will of the people’ has also been proposed to break the impasse with a second 
referendum or so-called ‘people’s vote’ advocated for by certain groups.42 In contrast, 
there is little support for parliament to simply ignore the advisory referendum result. 
Of those that do advocate for this, the strategy is to challenge the legitimacy of the 
June 2016 vote on the basis of breaches of electoral spending laws or foreign 
interference in the referendum, rather than simply dismissing the referendum as 
advisory.   
 
Brexit has thus revealed a schism between a sovereign parliament and the people it 
claims to represent. The classic distinction between ‘legally binding’ and ‘politically 
binding’ which is replete throughout British constitutional discourse can be deployed 
to explain this fissure and the role of referendums in the UK constitutional order;  
however, this analysis is also over-simplistic. Rather, the legitimating potential of 
referendums is a further example of the fragmentation of authority in the UK 
constitutional order but in this instance, the authority that challenges parliamentary 
sovereignty is not the courts, a devolved legislature or an international organisation 
                                                 
39 Miller (n 1) [119]-[125]. 
40 The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal Act 2017 passed by the Commons by a margin of 
498 to 114. See HC Deb 1 February 2017 vol 620, cols 1136-1140. In contrast, prior to the holding of the 
Brexit referendum in June 2016, 479 MPs stated their support for remain, with 158 MPs backing leave. 
See ‘EU vote: Where the cabinet and other MPs stand’ BBC News (22 June 2016) < 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946> accessed 7 September 2018. 
41 See Christian List, ‘Is Brexit the will of the people? The answer is not quite that simple’  (LSE Blogs 11 
April 2019) < https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/04/11/is-brexit-the-will-of-the-people-the-answer-
is-not-quite-that-simple/> accessed 9 May 2019; Lea Ypi, ‘Theresa May’s Trumpian statement was 
reminiscent of a sovereign dictator’ (The New Statesman, 21  March 2019) 
<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/03/theresa-may-s-trumpian-statement-was-
reminiscent-sovereign-dictator> accessed 9 May 2019.  
42 See ‘The Roadmap People’s Vote’ (People’s Vote) 
<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/in/pages/16122/attachments/original/1539865431/road
map_pv_final.pdf?1539865431>   accessed 9 May 2019.   
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but the people themselves; or, at the very least, different and competing 
conceptualisations of the people. Indeed, distinguishing between legal and mere 
political ramifications of a parliamentary decision arguably made the decision to hold 
a referendum on UK membership of the EU an easier pledge to make. Due to the lack 
of formal legal implications of an advisory referendum, little, if any, thought was 
given to opening Pandora’s Box and potentially revealing a schism between 
Parliament and the people. In turn, this reveals a tension at the heart of the claim that 
Parliament possesses constituent power but that it is ultimately held by the People— 
a claim that will be explored further below.43  
 
That the Brexit referendum result is an expression of ‘the will of the people’ is also 
over-simplistic; referendums in the UK have instead revealed a further schism in the 
very idea of ‘the people’ itself. A formalistic reading of the EU Referendum Act 2015 
would legitimate the decision to hold a UK-wide referendum (and Gibraltar) with the 
sovereignty of Parliament re-affirmed. A UK-wide referendum was approved by 
Parliament on the grounds that relations with the EU were reserved to the UK level 
and therefore the decision should be one taken by the UK as a whole.44 The alternative 
of a ‘double-lock mechanism’ whereby a majority of voters overall and a majority of 
voters in each of the constituent parts of the UK was rejected.45 The heterogeneous or 
plurinational composition of the UK demos was thus not recognised and Brexit has 
exposed fissures between the various constituent parts of the UK. With both Scotland 
and Northern Ireland voting to remain in the EU, and England and Wales voting to 
leave, the two constituent parts of the UK where the question as to their continued 
participation in the UK is a live political issue, has made this issue more salient than 
ever.46 Northern Ireland and Scotland face the prospect of being taken out of the EU 
with the consent of the ‘British people’ as a whole but without the consent of the 
people of Scotland and Northern Ireland. For Northern Ireland, where identities are 
more contested than in other parts of the UK, the issue is particularly pressing. Again, 
the case of home rule echoes similar tensions with Dicey, who was notoriously against 
referendums, nevertheless advocating for a UK-wide referendum on Irish home rule 
                                                 
43 See Part 3 below. 
44 Aileen McHarg, ‘Constitutional Change and Territorial Consent: The Miller case and the Sewel 
Convention’ in Mark Elliott, Jack Williams and Alison L Young (eds), The UK Constitution after Miller: 
Brexit and Beyond (Hart Publishing, 2018) 155, 156. 
45 ibid.  
46 In Northern Ireland for example, a number of recent polls suggest that Brexit has resulted in an 
increased support for a united Ireland in the event that a border poll is held. See Lord Ashcroft, ‘Brexit, 
the Border and the Union’ Lord Ashcroft Polls (19 June 2018) < 
https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2018/06/brexit-the-border-and-the-union/> accessed 7 September 
2018; a further online poll conducted by campaign group ‘Our Future Our Choice’ in September 2018 
suggested that 52% of respondents supported a united Ireland once the UK leaves the EU’. See ‘Brexit 
could create a majority for a united Ireland’ BBC News (3 September 2018) < 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-45391529> accessed 7 September 2018; Seán 
Danaher, ‘Further Analysis of Our Future our Choice NI Poll’, Progressive Pulse (5 September 2018) < 
http://www.progressivepulse.org/brexit/further-analysis-of-the-our-future-our-choice-ni-poll> 
accessed 7 September 2018. 
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in order to defeat the proposal.47 The result is that, like parliamentary sovereignty, the 
Brexit referendum conceptualised the UK as consisting of a unitary British demos and 
failed to give due consideration to its fragmented, plurinational aspects and the 
implications this has for both the legitimacy of the referendum result and of 
Westminster itself.  
 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Courts 
In addition to devolution, enactment of the HRA made a powerful impact on a 
constitutional landscape that traditionally eschewed the judicial protection of human 
rights. This has increased the propensity of both domestic courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights to act as competing authorities to that of Parliament. The HRA 
has thus been intensely scrutinised, owing to the statutory power in section 3 that 
requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with the ECHR ‘so far as it is 
possible to do so.’48 At times, this power has been exercised in circumstances whereby 
the courts have prima facie gone against the express wishes of Parliament in a 
particular statute.49 Nevertheless, the HRA preserves the sovereignty of Parliament in 
section 4 which allows courts to declare legislation incompatible with convention 
rights but such a declaration does not affect the validity of the provision in question.50  
 
The interpretive obligation under the HRA builds upon what has been termed 
‘common law constitutionalism.’ This describes the propensity of courts to interpret 
statutes in conformity with fundamental principles espoused by the common law such 
as the rule of law.51 Similar to section 3 HRA, courts have creatively interpreted 
statutes in certain instances which ostensibly appear to be contra Parliament’s 
intention. In the seminal case of Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission, for 
example, the House of Lords interpreted a provision that prima facie sought to oust 
judicial review in such a way as to render it redundant and preserve its jurisdiction.52 
More recently, in Evans v Attorney General, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Attorney General’s statutory power to veto a finding of the Upper Tribunal—a judicial 
body—in such a manner that it is difficult to imagine a circumstance whereby such a 
power could ever be exercised.53  
 
Courts have also been instrumental in the shift away from the Diceyan conception of 
parliamentary sovereignty to the ‘self-embracing’ understanding of the theory, with 
the development of what have been termed ‘constitutional statutes’. Constitutional 
                                                 
47 See Mads Qvortrup, ‘AV Dicey: The Referendum as the People’s Veto’ (1999) 20(3) History of Political 
Thought 531. 
48 HRA 1998, s3.  
49 See, for example, R v A (No.2) [2001] UKHL 25. For competing perspectives on the operation of the 
interpretive obligation contained in section 3 HRA see Danny Nicol, ‘Statutory interpretation and 
human rights after Anderson’ [2004] Public Law 274 and Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Statutory interpretation and 
human rights after Anderson: a more contextual approach’ [2004] Public Law 537. 
50 HRA 1998, s4.  
51 See Thomas Poole, ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ 
(2003) 23(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 435; Roger Masterman and Se-shauna Wheatle, ‘A Common 
Law Resurgence in Rights Protection?’ [2015] European Huan Rights Law Review 57. 
52 [1969] 2 AC 147. 
53 [2015] UKSC 21. 
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statutes are an attempt to make sense of what is prima facie a flat constitutional 
landscape in an era where elevating the normative hierarchy of some statutes over 
others is required to circumvent the legal difficulties that would arise should standard 
principles of legal interpretation such as ‘lex posterior derogate priori’ prevail. 
Constitutional statutes therefore are not assumed to have been impliedly repealed by 
later conflicting statutes.54 The idea of constitutional statutes is entirely a judicial 
creation; however, it is one that is a necessary result of this fragmentation of authority 
in the UK constitution. The idea of constitutional statutes, for example, has helped 
elaborate upon the sparse reasoning given in Factortame as to why the ECA 1972 
should prevail over the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988. Constitutional statutes are 
still liable to being expressly repealed, however, and almost a quarter of a century 
after Factortame, the Supreme Court affirmed in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary 
of State for Transport that despite EU law’s claim to primacy over domestic law, this 
claim was ultimately a function of the European Communities Act 1972. Due to this 
basis in the domestic law of the UK, the ostensible supremacy of EU legislation could 
potentially be tempered by other domestic constitutional principles of the UK, i.e. 
parliamentary sovereignty.55  
 
HS2 thus illustrates the fact that the courts, although instrumental in the evolution of 
parliamentary sovereignty, still baulk at outright rejection of it. Similarly, both the 
case law and constitutional theorists strive to reconcile cases such as Anisminic with 
parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary intention, despite the perceived growth 
in judicial power and rise of common law constitutionalism.56 In Anisminic, the court 
rendered the ouster clause impotent while simultaneously intimating that an ouster 
clause would be followed if the words used in the statute were ‘something much more 
specific than the bald statement than a determination shall not be called in question in 
any court of law.’57 When a draft ouster clause was included in the Asylum and 
Immigration Bill 2003 that proposed to do exactly that, senior judges speaking extra-
judicially warned that they could find it unconstitutional and the clause was 
ultimately dropped.58 Common law constitutionalism arguably reached its apotheosis 
in Jackson v Attorney General where the Lord Steyn intimated that it could in future 
deploy the nuclear option and find a statute unconstitutional, ‘[I]n exceptional 
circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of 
the courts’.59 Despite these developments, however, almost 50 years after Anisminic, 
in R(Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal the Court of Appeal held that 
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal was immune from judicial review.60 This was, 
however, over-turned by the Supreme Court, thus demonstrating that common law 
constitutionalism can have considerable interpretative force and can temper the 
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exercise of parliamentary sovereignty.61 Notwithstanding this, however, any judicial 
claims as to substantive limitations to parliamentary sovereignty are still obiter dicta 
only. It thus remains the case that rather than presenting an insurmountable challenge 
to parliamentary sovereignty, the doctrine is instead integral to the idea of common 
law constitutionalism. 
 
Towards a Paradigmatic shift? 
Like Lord Steyn in Jackson, Elliott too envisages an extreme, unprecedented 
constitutional crisis that would have to erupt before courts would fundamentally 
challenge the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.62 Certainly, ‘an attempt to 
abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts’ would be a prime candidate 
and Elliott’s example is evocative of Bruce Ackerman’s description of a constitutional 
moment where politics shifts from the everyday, ordinary running of the state to a 
more contested, combative form of higher law-making where formerly entrenched 
constitutional norms are up for grabs.63 The idea of constitutional moments provides 
an excellent lens through which to view and predict fundamental constitutional 
change in the UK’s uncodified constitutional landscape. However, short of an extreme 
crisis, the analysis above would suggest that there is little likelihood that courts will 
be the ultimate catalyst for finally ending parliamentary sovereignty and even if they 
were to do so, it is likely that they would be merely reacting to rather than 
precipitating this ultimate transition to legal constitutionalism. Moreover, the 
emphasis on legal constitutionalism implies that this would be the only result of such 
a crisis. That legal constitutionalism may be the ultimate destination of the current 
constitutional tumult does not, however, mean that the courts will be the catalyst for 
this change; nor does it mean that empowerment of the judiciary will be the exclusive 
outcome.   
 
Elliott’s ruminations were published in 2015, during the brief window between the 
2014 Scottish referendum and the 2016 Brexit referendum. A strong case can be made 
that the latter referendum and subsequent constitutional turmoil that ensued 
correlates closely with Ackerman’s idea of a constitutional moment. For Ackerman, a 
constitutional moment entails four steps: (i) a branch of government claims a 
constitutional mandate from the people to effect constitutional change; (ii) a proposal 
is put forward to such an effect; (iii) the proposal faces resistance from another branch 
of government; and (iv) a critical election takes place in which the people express 
‘broad and deep’ popular support for constitutional change with the opposing 
constitutional branch of government subsequently withdrawing its opposition.64 
Ackerman draws on Franklin D Roosevelt’s clash with the US Supreme Court over his 
New Deal programme as an illustrative example of a constitutional moment.65 
Constitutional moments therefore entail a clash between different branches of 
government—in the aforementioned example between the democratic branches and 
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the courts. Consequently, the phenomena that trigger constitutional moments may be 
much more ‘banal’ than an emergency situation whereby the legislature suspends or 
ends the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. Yet this does not mean that the 
constitutional change effected is less profound as a result.66  
 
In contrast to Ackerman’s example of Roosevelt’s New Deal, the majority judgment 
in Miller sets up no such confrontation but instead demonstrates the Supreme Court 
shying away from such a constitutional clash. Brexit therefore does not map on exactly 
to Ackerman’s description of a constitutional moment. Furthermore, the claim to a 
constitutional mandate from the people for Brexit as a result of the 2016 referendum 
is obfuscated by the outcome of the 2017 general election where no political party 
received an outright majority and thus ‘broad and deep’ popular support for the 
supposed constitutional change was not forthcoming.67 What is central to this 
constitutional moment is, instead, the role of the people and the potential conflict 
between the people and Parliament, and between different conceptions of ‘the people’. 
Ackerman views the people in his constitutional moment as interceding to resolve the 
constitutional dispute through affirmation or rejection of the constitutional change in 
an election. In the case of Brexit, however, the people themselves are an active 
participant in the constitutional clash as they emerge as a counter-authority to that of 
Parliament. There is also a clash between the people and different understandings of 
who ‘we the People’ are; between a unitary versus a heterogeneous demos. The 
emphasis on the judicial role in the changing constitution is understandable given that 
parliamentary sovereignty is an institutionally-orientated doctrine; however, in this 
constitutional moment, the courts have taken a backseat role, re-affirming the 
orthodox constitutional position of parliamentary sovereignty. In so doing, the courts 
have failed to recognise and facilitate the emergence of the people as a constitutional 
agent. This is a further example of the fragmentation of authority under the UK 
Constitution but not one that can be traced back to the courts. Accounts of 
constitutional crisis or change in the UK that focus wholly on the rise of legal 
constitutionalism and the role of the courts precipitating this may miss the challenge 
to parliamentary sovereignty being initiated by the people; a challenge that 
Parliament, ironically, unleashed upon itself.   
 
The result is a constitutional order struggling to accommodate several constitutional 
innovations such as referendums, the judicial protection of human rights or other 
constitutional norms, and quasi-federalism while simultaneously preserving the 
sacrosanctity of parliamentary sovereignty. The case can certainly be made that the 
UK has, to date, managed to accommodate these innovations; however, this failure to 
unpack the role of referendums in particular and their impact on parliamentary 
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sovereignty, merely leaving their influence on the UK constitutional order as ‘political, 
not legal’ only serves to leave more questions unanswered. The resultant 
constitutional torpor currently facing the UK, may be described as what Thomas Kuhn 
terms a ‘crisis’.68 Kuhn, referring to the history of science, argues that rather than being 
a steady accumulation of knowledge and progress, science is instead often 
tumultuous, prone to crises and revolutions. Crises occur when the dominant 
paradigm is incapable of explaining or accommodating new evidence. Very often the 
existing paradigm is modified and adapted but only to the extent that its core 
parameters remain inviolable. New theories may, of course, be proposed and these 
alternative paradigms may better explain the new data; however, their acceptance by 
the scientific community will not simply be down to their superior explanatory ability. 
The hegemonic forces will often resist any new theory in order to defend their 
subjective investment in the dominant paradigm.69 A change in the paradigm only 
occurs through the unparalleled explanatory force of the new paradigm eventually 
over-coming the hegemonic inertia in the system. Kuhn describes this process of a 
paradigm change, not as one of evolutionary development; rather, it is nothing short 
of a revolution.70 The changes to the UK constitutional order, coupled with the more 
radical contentions of Wade and Barber that Parliament is no longer sovereign have 
thus prompted modification of the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than a 
paradigmatic revolution to date. However,  the cumulative effect constitutional crisis 
resulting from Brexit may prove a step too far. The idea of constituent power may 
provide an insight into the trajectory that this paradigm shift may take.  
 
 
2. CONSTITUENT POWER 
The idea of constituent power is often traced back to Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès who, 
in his revolutionary pamphlet What is the Third Estate?, described it as ‘the moment of 
a constitution’s founding and an expression of the essential relation between the 
people and the state.’71 Constituent power, according to Sieyès, determines the 
constitutional structure and creates the ‘constituted powers’ that derive their validity 
from the constitution. The constitution therefore is an expression of the constituent 
power.72 Amidst the tumult of the French Revolution and regicide of Louis XVI, Sieyès 
sought a legitimating principle of constitutional authority that rejected the divine right 
of kings that underpinned the monarchy of  l’Ancien Régime.73 Sieyès turned instead 
to the people themselves, vesting them with the possession of constituent power. 
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Constituent power thus emerges from the rationalism of the enlightenment, filling the 
lacuna brought about by the rejection of God as a source of legitimate authority. 
Nevertheless, constituent power is often described as containing elements that are 
synonymous with a conception of sovereignty that Carl Schmitt described as ‘political 
theology’; namely, its emphasis on legitimate authority and commands issued by an 
omnipotent authority.74 On this point, other writers trace the origins of constituent 
power back further than Sieyès, with both Yaniv Roznai and Martin Loughlin finding 
its genesis the distinction Jean Bodin draws between sovereignty—the locus of 
authority—and government which is the instituted form through which sovereign 
rules.75 
 
Like Bodin’s distinction between sovereignty and government, by creating the 
constitutional institutions through which public power can be exercised, constituent 
power necessarily requires the positing of further powers that its exercise has 
created.76 These ‘constituted powers’—the constitutional powers of every day 
government—raise a number of questions regarding the nature of constituent power 
and its relation to the constitutional order it has established. Firstly, is constituent 
power exhausted at the moment of the constitution’s creation or can it also be 
expressed subsequently? Secondly, if it can be expressed after the constitution’s 
inception, how and what are the implications of this on the established constitutional 
order? Thirdly, if constituent power can be exercised subsequently, how can it 
possibly create a stable constituted order if its destructive potential constantly haunts 
the order it established? Constituent power therefore is Janus-faced, with both 
constructive and destructive potential; it can be both tyrannical and tyrannicidal. This 
destructive and constructive capacity of constituent power is clearly evident from the 
circumstances of the French Revolution, during which Sieyès articulated his theory, 
and in the influence that John Locke’s writings on the rights of the people to overthrow 
a tyrannical government had on the American colonists and their Declaration of 
Independence.77  
  
 
Exercising Constituent Power 
Due to its constructive and destructive potential, revolutions are unequivocal 
examples of when constituent power is exercised. The destructive potential of 
constituent power may not necessarily be quarantined exclusively to revolutionary 
moments, however;  consequently, constituent power has been described as having a 
‘tense and ambivalent relation towards the constitutional order founded by the 
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constituent power, regardless of the normative value of this constitutional order.78 As 
a result of this tension, David Dyzenhaus argues against the notion of constituent 
power as a means of understanding the normative basis for constitutionalism.79 
Eschewing constituent power, however, results in an inability to explain how a 
constitutional order is founded in the first instance. In contrast, to Dyzenhaus’ 
approach, some theories of constituent power deploy its creative potential only to 
explain this moment of revolution and the founding of the constitutional order. In 
essence, constituent power is viewed as a moment that ‘gives meaning’ to the 
constitutional order.80 These theories then attempt to ‘close’ the constituent moment 
by banishing it from the constituted order. All state power is then conceptualised as 
being constituted limited power. The defensive nature of these closed models of 
constituent power is demonstrated by the phenomenon of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments. Constituent power has a juristic function in a number of 
constitutional orders with courts deploying it to distinguish between the power to 
amend a constitution and the power to radically change or what the Indian Supreme 
Court has termed ‘abolishing the fundamental features’ of a constitution.’81 The Indian 
approach endorses the distinction between constituent and constituted power, with a 
limited amendment power amounting to the latter.82 In so doing, the ‘fundamental 
features’ of the constitution are preserved. Closed models of constituent power 
therefore can be viewed as defensive-oriented, banishing the destructive potential of 
constituent power beyond the very constitutional order it established; at the same 
time, however, it may be argued that its creative potential is banished also.83  
 
Open constituent power and the people 
Banishing the constituent power from the constituted order, however, raises an 
additional paradox as to the nature of constituent power. The creative potential of 
constituent power arguably creates the people themselves through its exercise and the 
creation of the constituted order; however, this raises only raises the further question 
of the relation between constituent power and the people as one must exist prior to 
the other but each cannot exist without the other.84 Alternative perspectives on 
constituent power attempt to address this paradox by eschewing the idea of a ‘closed’ 
constituent power exhausted at the moment of a constitution’s creation and, in turn, 
harness the creative potential of constituent power.85 These ‘open’ perspectives view 
constituent power, not as exhausted at the moment of a constitution’s inception, but 
                                                 
78 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent Power’ (2005) 12 
Constellations 223, 227. 
79See David Dyzenhaus, ‘Constitutionalism in an Old Key: Legality and Constituent Power’ (2012) 1(2) 
Global Constitutionalism 229.  
80 Wall (n 72) 379. 
81 Kesavananda v Kerala [1973] SC 1461 
82 Ibid; Rory O’Connell, ‘Guardians of the Constitution: Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms’ (1999) 
4Journal of Civil Liberties 48, 68-73. 
83 Wall (n 72) 391. 
84 Hans Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective 
Selfhood’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power 
and Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press, 2007) 9, 12. 
85 Wall (n 72). 
16 
 
acting as a catalyst or irritant for change in the constitutional order, constantly 
interacting and shaping the constituted powers. Open models of constituent power 
tend to be less concerned with the destructive potential of constituent power, instead 
stressing its creative and normative dimension and placing a distinct emphasis on the 
People by drawing a close link between constituent power and democracy. This 
normative account of constituent power reaches its apotheosis in Antonio Negri’s 
proclamation that ‘to speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy’.86 The 
tendency to conceptualise constituent power as almost a wholly normative theory is 
most clearly demonstrated in the field of global law, in particular, the work of those 
seeking to legitimate the EU and other international or pan-state institutions or 
sources of legal norms.87 
 
In this discussion of constituent power’s basis in ‘the People’, Carl Schmitt has been 
invoked as a surprise champion of democracy, heralded as aiming to ‘rescue the 
primacy of democracy over the rule of law’.88 For Schmitt’s decisionistic conception of 
constituent power, the state is the political unity of the people brought about by a 
decision taken by the Sovereign to distinguish friend from enemy.89 This decision 
creates the stability necessary for the state to be established; however, it continues to 
haunt the constitutional order it founds, lurking in the background and ready to re-
assert itself when the stability that it initially created risks succumbing to entropy. At 
such a point that can only be determined by the Sovereign, the Sovereign will 
intervene in the constitutional order to restore stability. This power to intervene, 
however, is not one that can be constrained by law; it is beyond the law and necessarily 
prior to law and the establishment of the legal order.90 Schmitt thus argues that 
constituent power or sovereignty is revealed in a constitutional order in extreme 
emergency situations where the rule of law cannot prescribe what ought to happen or 
control state power. In such instances, the constituent power reveals itself and the 
sovereign, as the sole arbiter, takes what it perceives to be the necessary steps to 
restore order. For Schmitt, therefore, ‘Sovereign is ‘he who decides on the exception’.91 
Constituent power, as a result, cannot be banished wholly from a constitutional order 
and liberal or legal constitutionalists who attempt to do so are doomed to fail. For 
Schmitt, the liberal perspective that the state is the legal order is utterly wrong; rather, 
the state exists prior to the legal order and consequently, the idea of constituent power 
cannot be banished by the constituted order.92   
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Through his claim that the state is the political unity of the people, one can contend 
that Schmitt considers constituent power to be vested in the people and his reputation 
as a champion of democracy vindicated. However, Schmitt’s claim that the people 
may hold constituent power was a reaction— and concession— to the relative success 
of democracy at the time as distinct from an endorsement of it.93 Schmitt certainly 
never argued that only the people can be sovereign as he did not contend that the 
people could be the sole possessors of constituent power. Rather, constituent power 
could also be held by a monarch and, indeed, this was Schmitt’s personal preference. 
Renato Cristi argues that Schmitt adopted the term ‘constituent power’ in 
Constitutional Theory in order to recognise the power of the people.94 His preceding 
work, however, used the term ‘sovereignty’, reflecting Schmitt’s preference for the 
monarchical principle. Schmitt’s use of sovereignty, moreover, lacked the creative 
dimension of constituent power; instead sovereignty—particularly in Schmitt’s earlier 
writings— is more synonymous with the power to issue military commands or 
imperium as seen in the Roman Republic and Empire.95 Constituent power, however, 
due to this creative dimension cannot simply be conceptualised as a command; 
nevertheless, many of the same elements of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty are present 
in his theory of ‘constituent power’.96  
 
Furthermore, Schmitt always insisted that his theory of sovereignty was descriptive 
rather than prescriptive.97 This, coupled with Schmitt’s personal preference for vesting 
constituent power in a monarch suggests that Schmitt’s theory of constituent power 
vested in the people should also be seen as descriptive rather than normative and 
certainly not motivated to ‘rescue the primacy of democracy over the rule of law’.98 
Schmitt’s theory of constituent power is therefore as equally legitimating of 
monarchical power as it is of democracy. Cristi further argues that Schmitt only 
affirmed the democratic potential of constituent power because he had found a way 
to neutralise it through the rule of law; in particular, through the idea of representative 
democracy. Indeed, the very idea of constituent power as a means to moderate 
Rousseau’s conception of popular sovereignty is inherent in Sieyès’ use of the term.99  
Thus, Cristi argues that ‘Schmitt could escape the grip of democracy’s logical 
consistency because he himself was not a sincere and honest democrat.’100 Throughout 
Schmitt’s work, there is a clear authoritarian bent with fear of the people latent. This 
should come as no surprise in light of Schmitt’s willing embrace of National Socialism, 
a point that seems conspicuously absent from numerous ruminations on Schmitt and 
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constituent power. In turn, this raises further questions as to both the creative and 
destructive aspects of Schmitt’s conception of constituent power and constituent 
power more generally.  
 
 
3. THE LOCUS OF CONSTITUENT POWER IN THE UK 
As the archetypal example of the exercise of constituent power is at the establishment 
of a new constitutional order, it should be of no surprise that the UK, lacking a clear-
cut revolutionary moment has eschewed constituent power. Indeed, the best 
candidate for such a revolutionary moment—the civil war and execution of King 
Charles I in 1649— preceded the establishment of the UK and resulted in the 
dictatorial Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell which was then followed by the 
constitutional ‘fudge’ of the so-called Glorious Revolution and restoration of the 
monarchy, albeit with greatly reduced powers.101 Arguably, there was a lack of 
intellectual and revolutionary philosophies to back up the revolution in the first 
instance and effect a new and truly innovative constitutional order; however, Martin 
Loughlin does attempt to trace the genesis of constituent power thought and 
democracy to the Levellers and their role in the Parliamentarian army.102 The difficulty 
in this argument, as acknowledged by Loughlin, however, is that the Levellers lost.103 
Up until relatively recently therefore, it appeared that constituent power did not 
feature prominently in British constitutional discourse. Writing in 2007, Loughlin, for 
example, argues that constituent power serves no juristic function in the UK having 
been ‘entirely absorbed into the doctrine of the absolute authority of the Crown-in-
Parliament to speak for the British nation’.104 An equivalence between parliamentary 
sovereignty and constituent power was also drawn by Alexis de Tocquvielle 
describing the Westminster parliament as ‘at once a legislative and constituent 
assembly’.105 Similarly, Joel Colón-Ríos contends that constituent power was not 
needed in a constitutional order where Parliament can create any norm it wishes.106 
Colón-Ríos’ subsequent work, however, argues that the idea of constituent power was 
utilised in the British constitutional order prior to Dicey’s dominance.107 In particular, 
constituent power played an important role in empire and understanding the 
administration of the UK’s overseas colonies. For instance, the Imperial Parliament 
was often considered to possess constituent power to found the overseas colonies of 
the British crown.108 In total, Colón-Ríos identifies five separate conceptions of 
constituent power that can be seen throughout British history: constituent power as 
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parliamentary sovereignty; the Crown and Parliament and sources of constituent 
power; constituent power as the right of the people to instruct their elected 
representatives; constituent power as the right of resistance; and constituent power as 
popular sovereignty.109  
 
This conflation of parliamentary sovereignty with constituent power raises the 
question of whether constituent power in the UK can be described as vested in the 
People. Loughlin does acknowledge that constituent power can be vested in a 
monarch; however, he does so only briefly and gives the example of the Japanese 
emperor.110 At no point is the idea entertained that constituent power is possessed by 
the British monarch. That constituent power is possessed by the people instead 
appears to be axiomatic. Parliament becomes the locus for constituent power with its 
democratic credentials deployed to square the circle. Despite this, it still remains the 
case that it is one thing to say that Parliament possesses constituent power; it is quite 
another to say that this power is vested in the people. Thomas Poole acknowledges 
this, arguing that Parliament is not and cannot be the fundamental source of political 
authority; rather, Parliament possesses derived constituent power— a constraint power 
that acts according to the formal procedures and rules that were established by the 
constitution.111 Original constituent power, however, still ultimately vests in the 
people. Poole argues that Miller paves the way for a ‘more bespoke constituent 
process’ whereby the people can be involved in substantial constitutional changes.112 
Poole thus envisages a symbiotic relationship between Parliament and the people, 
mollifying any tension that may exist between the two. In addition, in much the same 
manner as Loughlin, he gives no further justificatory reason that constituent power 
ultimately resides in the people, again implying that it is axiomatic.  
 
Poole attributes the notion of derived constituent power to Roznai who, in turn, draws 
a close link between derived constituent power and the concept of delegation— the 
entrusting of a competence or power in a constitutional organ by the people.113 
Delegation also appears as one of the five concepts of constituent power identified by 
Colon-Ríos who argues that constituent power in the UK has been understood in 
certain instances as the right of constituents to instruct their Member of Parliament 
(MP).114 The importance of ‘trust’ to derived and delegated concepts of constituent 
power underlies their ‘limited’ nature. Delegated constituent power has been 
deployed to explain the relation between the people and constituent assemblies in the 
United States with William Partlett contending that the limited nature of the 
constituent power exercised by a number of state-level constitutional assemblies in 
the US is explained by agency theory and the contention that the delegates to these 
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conventions were acting as agents of the People.115 Aside from the oxymoronic 
implications of a ‘limited constituent power’, the difficulty with transplanting 
delegated or derived constituent power to explain the relation between the British 
Parliament and the People is that the idea that MPs act as the agents of their 
constituents has been vehemently rejected. Rather, MPs, it is claimed, act as 
representatives with Edmund Burke famously stating that ‘your representative owes 
you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if 
he sacrifices it to your opinion.’116 This representative understanding has been recalled 
throughout the various Brexit debates in Parliament, notably by MPs opposed to the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU.117 If Parliament does exercise constituent power 
therefore and it is derived from the people, it is done so on the basis of 
representative— not popular— democracy, thus echoing Cristi’s analysis of Schmitt 
that his embrace of constituent power vested in the people is tempered by the fact that 
he found a way to neutralise it through representative democracy. Consequently, the 
link between the people and Parliament is much more tenuous than delegated or 
derived constituent power would prima facie suggest.  
 
The idea of Parliament possessing a derived or limited constituent power is further 
complicated by the fact that there are no actual limits to Parliament’s law-making 
power with the sole exception of Parliament being unable to limit any future 
Parliament’s law-making power—although, as we have seen, this exception has itself 
been challenged. As noted, this limit is paradoxically necessary in order to preserve 
Parliament’s continuing sovereignty. Roznai’s discussion of derived— or what he 
prefers to term secondary— constituent power is delineated in the context of a theory 
of unconstitutional constitutional amendments; i.e. to formulate a theory of a limited 
amendment power. Its transplantation to the UK where Parliament can make or 
unmake any law it wishes therefore is problematic. Moreover, it is also difficult to see 
from either a theoretical or historical perspective exactly how Parliament possesses 
delegated or derived constituent power. The people never delegated power to 
Parliament; rather, Parliament wrested it from the Crown which had previously 
possessed it. Certainly, the same case can be made about many constitutional orders 
given the limited role of the people in constitutional drafting or constitutional 
affirmation and particularly so in the context of constitutions externally imposed;118 
however, what is notable about the British example is that this seizing of the 
constituent power was made long before Parliament made any meaningful claim to 
be democratic or representative of the people. British constitutional history can 
instead be better understood as Parliament’s coup d’état and seizure of the constituent 
power being gradually democratically legitimised through the expansion of the 
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electoral franchise. In much the same way as Hannah Arendt describes Sieyès as 
placing ‘the sovereignty of the nation in the place that a sovereign monarch had 
vacated’119 so too did the English Parliament step in to the place left vacant by the 
execution of Charles I. Whether this Parliament, however, can be equated to the 
sovereignty of the nation—the people— is a different question.  
 
The anti-democratic basis of constituent power in the UK 
In contrast to the US where delegated constituent power was deployed to prevent 
constitutional assemblies from acting as runaway assemblies, fears of Westminster 
acting as such do not feature prominently in UK constitutional discourse.120 Such a 
lack of fear is perhaps indicative of the disempowered status of the people whose 
expression can only be gleaned through representative rather than popular 
sovereignty. This lack of fear also stands in marked contrast to the idea of an 
omnipotent parliament capable of passing any law it sees fit.  The creative and 
therefore destructive or tyrannical potential of Parliament to act as a runaway 
assembly is thus enormous. Nevertheless, Dicey flippantly dismissed any concerns 
regarding the substantive scope of Parliament’s law-making ability owing to the 
political disposition of the English people. Indeed, Dicey advanced his theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty precisely because of his belief in the rule of law as the peak 
of English civilisation. It was unimaginable for Dicey that Parliament would violate 
the rule of law to such an extreme, notwithstanding a number of examples from 
Ireland and the colonies that should have undermined this faith.121   
 
The people or a monarch are not the only candidates for possession of the constituent 
power in a constitutional order, however. Schmitt further suggested that constituent 
power could be concentrated in the hands of an aristocratic minority or oligarchy, with 
Cristi suggesting that Schmitt had in mind the powerful Italian city states of the 
Renaissance.122 In light of Parliament’s gradual democratisation, there is a strong case 
to be made that Parliament, for much of its existence, possessed—and perhaps 
continues to possess— constituent power on this aristocratic or oligarchical basis. 
Certainly, vast swathes of the citizens of the UK were excluded from the democratic 
franchise for centuries, with women not granted the same electoral rights as men until 
1928.123 In addition to sex, other limitations to the franchise included property 
ownership and religion. The emphasis on property restrictions, while certainly not 
exclusive to the UK, suggests that political authority derived from property itself 
rather than being inherent in the individual. The clearest distortion of this gap 
between Parliament and the people was in Ireland where the largely Catholic majority 
was disenfranchised for most of its tumultuous 120 years as part of the UK. Ireland 
instead was ruled by a Protestant ascendancy and when 26 of the 32 counties of Ireland 
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achieved independence, the idea of parliamentary sovereignty was abandoned by the 
fledging state, with strong constitutional controls placed on the constituted legislature 
out of fear of it acting as a runaway assembly.124 Furthermore, embedded remnants of 
this aristocratic order remain in the British constitutional order. As noted above, the 
Crown still retains a role in legislating, albeit one rendered impotent through 
convention.125 Moreover, only one house of Parliament is actually democratically 
elected and, while representative democracy’s capacity to temper constituent power 
has already been noted, this is further amplified by the First Past the Post method of 
elections in the UK and its distortive effect on the composition of the House of 
Commons.126 The result of this conflation of parliamentary sovereignty with 
constituent power is surmised by Kalyvas: 
 
[P]arliamentary sovereignty finds in the constituent power its own impossibility. It is 
exposed as a usurpation of the constituent power by a constituted power which 
reduces popular sovereignty to parliamentary representation and to the powers of 
elected officials.127  
 
This usurpation is further entrenched by the contention that Parliament is no longer 
sovereign. By empowering Parliament to limit itself, self-embracing sovereignty 
enables such a radical reform to be effected by a constituted power or combination of 
constituted powers. However, this collapse is also evident in the orthodox Diceyan 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty. That Parliament could not change the rules 
affecting itself suggests that the ultimate constitution-making power in the UK was a 
step above Parliament or that there was (and is) a distinction between constituent 
power and Parliament’s law-making power, notwithstanding the breadth of this latter 
power. However, the same objections can be raised concerning any constituent 
assembly. Some source prior to that assembly had to vest that assembly with 
constituent power raising the question as to whether the assembly possesses 
constituent power at all. As noted, derived constituent power is an attempt to explain 
this phenomenon and avoid the problem of infinite regression by linking constituent 
power with the people; however, but this is problematic in the UK owing to 
parliament’s possession of the constituent power before it was meaningfully 
democratic. Consequently, the difficulty lies not with the claim that parliamentary 
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sovereignty is a usurpation of the constituent power but a difficulty that afflicts all 
closed-models of constituent power.  
 
Relational Constituent Power 
The most rigorous attempt to construct a theory of constituent power applicable to the 
UK is, without a doubt, the work of Martin Loughlin.128 Loughlin identifies three 
different theories of constituent power: normativism, which either deploys 
constituent power in the revolutionary moment but then banishes it from the legal 
order or rejects the notion of constituent power altogether; decisionism, which 
Loughlin attributes to Schmitt; and relationalism.129 Relational constituent power is 
Loughlin’s attempt to re-work decisionism and accepts many of Schmitt’s 
foundations: for example, the necessity of relating a constitution’s normative aspects 
to conditions that actually exist.130 Moreover, it rejects the idea that the state is 
synonymous with the legal order, arguing that the political is a domain of 
indeterminacy that cannot be organised in accordance with some grandiose theory.131 
As a constitution is political as well as legal, there will always be a gap between the 
normative and the factual and this gap must be filled through the practice of 
governing.132 Relational constituent power, however, differs from decisionism in one 
crucial aspect. Whereas decisionism struggles with the paradox of constitutionalism— 
the question of the people existing prior to the exercise of constituent power but also 
being constituted by the exercise of constituent power— relational constituent power 
seeks to overcome this by arguing that constitutional ordering is dynamic and never 
static. Relational constituent power instead establishes a dialectical relationship 
between the ‘the nation’ posited for the purpose of self-constitution and the 
constitutional form through which it can speak authoritatively.133 In so doing, 
relationalism seeks to harness the creative potential of constituent power by providing 
an account that is ‘able to enrich constitutional ordering’.134 In order to ensure this, 
Loughlin argues that: 
 
If the democratic potential of this modern shift in the source of authority is to be 
retained, the political space must be recognised as incorporating an unresolved 
dialectic of determinacy and indeterminacy, of closure and openness. This is the basis 
of the relational approach.135 
 
‘The space of the political can be seen as a space of freedom (‘the absolute beginning’), 
but if it is to be maintained, institutionalization of rule is required.’136 Loughlin 
therefore envisages a ‘dynamic of constitutional development without end’.137 
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Loughlin further argues that constituent power is vested in the people but that does 
not mean that political authority is located in the people. Consequently, relational 
constituent power does not correlate with the assertion made by advocates of popular 
sovereignty that the people possess political authority; rather, relational constituent 
power identifies a ‘virtual’ equality of the people but in reality it ‘founds an actual 
association divided into rulers and ruled in a relation of domination’.138 Relational 
constituent power therefore seeks to establish a dialectic of ‘right’ between the rulers 
and the ruled such that it ‘seeks constantly to irritate the institutionalised form of 
constitutional authority’.139 In turn, Loughlin seeks a more constructive application of 
the paradoxical aspects of constituent power. For Loughlin, the constituent power is 
not only engaged (and exhausted) at the founding moment; instead it continues to 
operate and function within an established regime ‘as an expression of the open, 
provisional, and dynamic aspects of constitutional ordering.’140  
 
Relationalism contends that, ‘[C]onstituent power, produced by an intrinsic 
connection between the symbolic and the actual, signifies the dynamic aspect of 
constitutional discourse.’141 Loughlin, however, cautions against subsuming 
constituent power into the constituted order as the very tension that gives constituent 
power its dynamic potential would be eliminated.142 There is always a gulf between 
theory and reality— between facticity and normativity. The former is an expression of 
sovereignty whereas the latter is an expression of sovereign authority and it is in the 
dialectic relation between the two that constituent power resides. Loughlin thus 
contends that: 
 
…the constitution of a legal order by a political unity involves an exercise in positive 
law-making whereas the constitution of a political unity through a legal order refers 
not to the positing of a legal order (in a strict sense) but in the constitution of political 
unity through Droit Politique (political right).143 
 
Loughlin thus argues that constituent power could equally be termed ‘constituent 
right’. Ultimately, Loughlin must leave open the question as to where the locus of 
constituent power in the UK— and indeed any state— lies as he argues that: 
 
[L]egitimacy must be claimed in the name of the people, and the question of who 
represents that people remains the indeterminate question of modern politics. The 
function of constituent power is to keep that question open, not least because ‘the 
people-as-on is the hallmark of totalitarianism’.144 
 
In this regard, relational constituent power seeks to maintain the creative dimension 
of decisionism while at the same time attempting to address some of the absolutist 
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concerns raised by Schmitt’s conception of constituent power. Loughlin strives to 
preserve a space of freedom for the political and, ostensibly, one could contend that 
parliamentary sovereignty fulfils this function in the UK constitutional order. With no 
legal constraints on the content of legislation, Parliament is as free as possible to 
embody and preserve the political. Relational constituent power and its 
conceptualisation of a ‘dynamic of constitutional development without end’ has the 
potential to insert the people into a constitutional order that was founded without a 
clear-cut revolutionary moment and in so doing, legitimate gradual, incremental 
change. At the same time, however, relational constituent power evinces a degree of 
radical prowess by asserting its credentials of indeterminate scope and ends. In 
striving to strike this equilibrium between creativity and constraint, between rulers 
and ruled, Loughlin insists on the people being able to challenge those who claim to 
speak on their behalf. Relational constituent power is thus acutely aware of the 
destructive or tyrannical potential of constituent power but also its constructive and 
tyrannicidal potential too.  
 
CONFRONTING THE LOCUS OF CONSTITUENT POWER IN THE UK 
Colón-Ríos argues that appeals to the concept of constituent power ‘typically involve 
some sort of challenge to the constitutional status quo’.145 Relational constituent 
power, in contrast, when applied to the UK constitutional order, legitimates rather 
than challenges the status quo through supporting dynamic but slow, incremental 
constitutional change. This incrementalism makes it is difficult to see how, in the UK 
context, that constituent power is not collapsed into the constituted powers and, as a 
result, how the creative potential of constituent power is preserved. The result is the 
current constitutional torpor where parliamentary sovereignty is preserved at the 
expense of deeper and more fundamental reform of the UK constitutional settlement. 
Despite its ostensible radical potential, this enfeeblement of constituent power is 
potentially inherent to relationalism. This creative weakness can be traced back to 
shared foundations between relational constituent power and Schmitt’s decisionism. 
As noted, Schmitt embraced democracy but only because he found a way of taming 
the people: through representation and the rule of law. Loughlin acknowledges this, 
arguing that Schmitt saw the President rather than the parliament of the Weimar 
Republic as the possessor of constituent power due to his: 
 
…concern about the radical implications of the rise of mass democracy and his analysis 
of the constituent power vested in the President served the purpose of safeguarding 
the authority of the social-democratic form of constitutional ordering under the 
Weimar Constitution.146  
 
This reading paints Schmitt’s vesting of constituent power in the President as an 
inherently defensive move, designed to temper the destructive potential of constituent 
power were it to be expressed through a mass democratic movement. Loughlin takes 
a similar step when he argues that although constituent power is vested in the people, 
this does not mean that political authority is vested in the people as maintained by 
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adherents to popular sovereignty.147  Relationalism seeks to leave the question as to 
where the locus of constituent power in a constitutional order resides unresolved by 
allowing the people to challenge those who speak on their behalf. In so doing, 
however, relationalism and open models of constituent power face the paradox that 
the easier it is for constituent power to be exercised and break through to the 
constituted order, the less legal theory needs to resort to constituent power as an 
explanation; i.e. the risk is greater for open models that constituent power will be 
absorbed by the constituted powers. The result is that rather than make the constituted 
powers more radical, the opposite occurs, and the constituent power is pacified. By 
leaving as much power up for grabs as possible to politics, relational constituent 
power appears to possess radical potential; however, this conclusion can only be 
reached if one ignores all other power structures in the British constitutional order 
that suppress this radicalness. If relational constituent power is to have creative 
potential, it must insist on critical appraisal of the means through which the people 
can issue their challenge those who claim to speak on their behalf. What is unclear, 
however, from Loughlin’s account is how the people actually muster this challenge in 
the UK; no concrete examples are given. Relational constituent power thus does not 
necessarily have to legitimate the extant constitutional order but it may be susceptible 
to falling into this function.  
 
Rather than seeking to legitimate the status quo ex-ante, UK constitutional theory and 
practice could instead benefit from a more antagonistic understanding of the relation 
between Parliament and the people through a descriptive—as distinct from 
normative—appraisal as to the locus of constituent power in the UK; an 
understanding of constituent power that does not necessarily seek to reconcile the 
locus of constituent power with ‘the people’. Rather, by acknowledging the anti-
democratic basis of Parliament’s extant possession of constituent power in the UK 
owing to the aristocratic remnants of the constitution and enfeeblement of the people 
or peoples, the locus of constituent power can be legitimately challenged and the true 
creative potential of constituent power unleashed.  
 
The Consequences of the Anti-Democratic basis of Constituent Power in the UK 
The collapsing of constituent power into the constituted power in the UK is further 
compounded by responses to the contention that Parliament is no longer sovereign. 
Barber argues that parliamentary sovereignty is no longer a principle of the UK 
constitution as: 
 
The rule of Parliamentary sovereignty could not be changed by Parliament and could 
not, as a matter of law, be departed from by the courts. However, the courts did 
possess a political capacity to alter the fundamental rule of the British constitution, 
and it was this capacity that they had exercised in Factortame.148 
 
In response, Alison Young contends that Barber incorrectly equates a modification to 
the rule that ‘whatever the Queen-in Parliament enacts as a statute is law’ with a 
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modification of the rule of parliamentary sovereignty.149 Young contends, however, 
that ‘whatever the Queen-in-Parliament enacts as a statute is law’ is better described 
as ‘a component of the rule of recognition not as the rule of parliamentary 
sovereignty’.150 The rule of recognition is, itself, however, not the same as 
parliamentary sovereignty.151 The difficulty with this analysis, however, is that 
explanations as to a change in the rule of recognition tend to focus on institutional 
forces, mollifying what role, if any, the people can play in this. Analyses centre on 
change ‘in the customary consensus among senior legal officials’152 leading to 
explanations of sovereignty as ‘shared with the courts’153 or as ‘bi-polar sovereignty,’ 
with Parliament possessing ‘legal sovereignty’ but requiring the ‘coercive 
sovereignty’ of the courts to enforce it.154 The shift is thus seen as empowering  the 
constituted power of the courts. If it is the case that Parliament is no longer sovereign, 
it is because constituent power is further collapsed in to the constituted power by these 
new theories of sovereignty. Young arguably comes closest to expressly 
acknowledging this collapse of the constituent power into the constituted power by 
arguing that sovereignty in the UK needs to be understood by: 
 
… focusing not on the lawmaking power, be it limited or otherwise, but on the power 
to alter constitutive rules. In this sense, it is closer to an understanding of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz or an analysis of constituent power.155  
 
Like TRS Allan,156 Young sees a role for the courts in sovereignty, not because of the 
courts’ superior ability to defend normative values but because a role for the courts 
would mean that modification of constitutive rules rest both in the hands of the 
legislature and the courts.157 The most radical of legal changes—revolution of the legal 
order— is couched in technical language and debate as to whether the rule of 
recognition has changed and is thus one effected exclusively by the constitutional 
organs of the state; there is no need to invoke the people to explain this change.  
 
Despite its explanatory force, however, it is difficult to see how this shared sovereignty 
can confront what Young identifies in her later work as the UK constitution’s potential 
susceptibility to populism. Young contends that this is due to the UK Constitution’s 
‘prevalence to favour pragmatic over redemptive arguments, evolving through a 
series of specific resolutions to practical issues, combined with the overly simplistic 
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use of parliamentary sovereignty as the means to resolve constitutional debates.’158 
Populist critiques of constitutional democracy tend to centre on the elitist hegemony 
of power at the expense of the ‘true’ people of the state’s ‘heartland’.159 Walker notes 
that populists tap into parts of modern constitutional discourse that emphasise the 
ideas of popular sovereignty, the constituent power of the people and the purest 
crystallization of collective political will.160 A constitutional order in which the 
constituent power is wholly collapsed into the constituted power of parliamentary 
sovereignty simultaneously creates the conditions that fuels populist sentiment as 
well as providing them with the constitutional tools necessary to effect the political 
changes they wish should they ever seize power.  
 
These challenges can potentially be addressed, however, by expressly acknowledging   
the anti-democratic basis of parliament’s possession of constituent power and 
restructuring the constitutional order to facilitate points of authoritative contestation 
that can harness the creative dimension of constituent power. As noted, it is in the 
space between normativity and facticity that the assessment as to the people’s claim 
to the constituent power can be stress-tested and where the  irritative potential of the 
people should be evident. In contrast to constitutions where the separation of powers 
creates flashpoints where constitutional authorities may clash and, in a constitutional 
moment, change is effected through the ‘will of the people’; the dominance of 
Parliament in the UK constitutional order obviates such points of contestation. Much 
like John Locke’s theory of the prerogative, the people in the UK constitutional order 
are left with no other possibility but to revolt.161  
 
The True Role of Referendums in the UK Constitutional Order 
In this space between facticity and validity, the true impact of referendums on the 
British constitutional order can be understood. Attempts have been made to 
accommodate an understanding of referendums in the UK that goes beyond simply 
considering them to be advisory while at the same time preserving parliamentary 
sovereignty. Gavin Phillipson, for example, argues that a constitutional convention 
should be acknowledged where the result of a referendum will be followed by 
Parliament.162 This however, only raises the further problem of resolving a conflict 
between two competing conventions. Such is the case with the Brexit referendum as, 
should a new convention arise of Parliament implementing the result of a referendum, 
it would clash with the Sewel convention that Westminster will not ordinarily legislate 
in an area of devolved competence without the prior permission of the devolved 
institutions. One could contend that ‘ordinarily’ could be interpreted to exclude 
precisely such a scenario, with the referendum result taking primacy over the 
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constitutional principle of devolved autonomy; however, this only raises the further 
question of why this should be the case. Again, the question of a heterogeneous versus 
a plurinational British demos remains unanswered.  
 
A convention therefore is limited to the extent that it can clarify the role of 
referendums in the UK constitutional order. Rather, what can assist in this regard is a 
clearer understanding of how referendums can challenge the authority of parliament 
owing to the undemocratic basis of Parliament’s claim to the constituent power. 
Referendums, far from being simply advisory, have the potential to act as an 
alternative authority to the legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty, particularly if the 
question asked is one that Parliament does not want answered in the affirmative as 
was the case with the Brexit referendum.163 This potential is further amplified by the 
People’s otherwise weak constitutional role as the pent-up irritative potential of a 
contesting claim to the constituent power is channelled through one outlet. This is not 
the same as saying that a referendum is an expression of the constituent power or even 
a claim to the constituent power; rather, it demonstrates that the tentative democratic 
legitimacy of the Crown-in-Parliament cannot be used to square the circle between 
Parliament’s possession of constituent power and ‘the people’. While this point may 
prima facie legitimate referendums in the UK as a means to re-invigorate the 
constitutional order by creating a commensurate authority to challenge Parliament, a 
clearer delineation of this contestation of authority may equally provide ammunition 
for those wary of the use of referendums in the UK and should be a factor borne in 
mind before the decision to hold a referendum in future is taken. It also has the 
potential to provide a strong justificatory basis for more robust or structured 
regulation of the referendum process itself. Regardless, the claim that referendums in 
the UK are simply advisory should be dismissed.  
 
 
The Role of Conventions in the UK Constitutional Order 
Indeed, the considerable reliance the UK places in constitutional conventions to 
constrain public power demonstrates the expansive dichotomy between facticity and 
normativity in the UK constitutional order. Conventions are necessary in all 
constitutional orders; however, in the case of the UK they do more than their fair share 
of heavy-lifting.164 The binding nature of conventions has been described as a mixture 
of moral obligation and precedent with Dicey, for example, describing conventions as 
‘the morality of the constitution’.165 Effectiveness is of fundamental importance to 
establishing the existence of and, by extension, the legitimacy a convention; however, 
without the moral or normative dimension, one cannot distinguish between a 
convention and what is simply a followed practice.166 Conventions, however, are 
distinct from legal rules and principles given this importance of efficacy to their 
existence and, by extension, legitimacy. Generally, a convention cannot place the same 
claim to validity as a legal rule, owing to its creation beyond the formal rules of a legal 
                                                 
163 See text at n 40.  
164 Nick Barber, ‘Laws and Conventions’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 294, 294. 
165 Dicey (n 1) 417; McHarg (n 6) 859. 
166McHarg (n 6) 857. 
30 
 
order. Conventions thus tend to evolve through practice rather than through a 
formalised, validated rule-creation procedure. The legitimacy of a convention 
therefore is more fundamentally dependent upon its efficacy than a formalised legal 
rule. That stated, McHarg argues that there have been attempts to create conventions 
in a declaratory manner in the UK.167 Adam Perry and Adam Tucker further argue 
that there exist ‘top-down constitutional conventions’ created through the use of 
normative rule-making powers as distinct from ‘bottom up conventions’ that emerge 
through the practices of constitutional actors.168 
 
Conventions in the UK constitutional order, however, not only give effect to the 
constitutional identity and aspirations of the UK; often they are the exclusive defender 
of this identity. Convention, for example, ensures that the vast, unwritten prerogative 
powers, although legally vested in the monarch are, in practice exercised by the 
Government. If such powers were to be exercised by the monarch, it would radically 
alter the constitutional terrain of the UK and undermine its description as a 
constitutional democracy.169 This gap between facticity and validity may be defended 
as symptomatic of the UK constitution’s inherent flexibility and thus a testament to 
the irritative potential of constituent power. Moreover, the fact that conventions tend 
to be the product of politics rather than law adds an additional dimension of 
democratic legitimacy to them. Conventions, it may be argued, are the product of 
politics and thus simply manifestations of the will of the people and therefore 
conventions demonstrate that the People are firmly empowered in the UK 
constitutional order, notwithstanding their de jure status. On this reading, the UK 
constitution scores well on relational constituent power’s insistence that the people 
must be able to challenge those who claim to speak on their behalf.  
 
 However, as the legitimacy of conventions is dependent upon their efficacy, 
conventions may also be symptomatic of constitutional inertia. Jennings, for example 
states that: 
 
Capacity for invention is limited, and when an institution works well in one way it is 
deemed unnecessary to change it to see if it would work equally well in another. 
Indeed, people begin to think that the practices ought to be followed. It was always 
done in the past, they say; why should it not be done so now?170 
 
The normative dimension of long-established conventions therefore may be forgotten 
or not adequately interrogated; rather, a convention’s legitimacy may become wholly 
dependent upon its efficacy. This echoes Thomas Paine’s contention that ‘Government 
which operates by precedent without regard to what lies behind that precedent, is one 
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of the vilest systems’.171 Furthermore, the actual legitimacy of constitutional 
conventions has not been fully interrogated— a point that concerns Perry and Tucker 
given the prominent role conventions play in the British Constitution and that ‘self-
regulation’ which is essentially what conventions are is viewed with scepticism in 
other areas of law.172 This becomes further pronounced in the context of ‘top-down 
conventions’.173 In turn, if the gap between the de jure and de facto constitution is 
significant, it shrouds the constitution in clouds of ambiguity making it inaccessible 
to those without legal training or insider knowledge.174 While conventions in the 
British constitution have generally been benevolent— a point noted by Perry and 
Tucker as perhaps why their legitimacy has not been fully interrogated175— 
conventions may, nevertheless, mask where the true power of the state resides. A 
rather striking example of this is the manner in which Augustus made use of 
conventions and the trappings of the old legal order to hide the true autocratic nature 
of the Roman Principate, giving the perception that the Republic still endured.176 
These points thus undermine the claim that the practices and conventions that 
underpin a constitution can be attributed to the people. In light of this, the wide gap 
between facticity and validity in the UK constitution cannot be described as the 
manifestation of the irritative potential of the constituent power vested in the people. 
Rather, it is, again, symptomatic of enfeebled role of the people in the UK 
constitutional order, further undermining the claim that constituent power is vested 
in the people. Movement away from this reliance on convention towards entrenched 
constitutional norms should thus not necessarily be seen as an anti-political or anti-
democratic.   
 
Towards Federalism?  
Acknowledgment of the anti-democratic basis of Parliament’s possession of the 
constituent power may also help to tame the hubristic manner in which Westminster 
has exercised its sovereignty, vis-à-vis other constitutional institutions. To date, 
Parliament’s claim to sovereignty has remained inviolable precisely because other 
constitutional organs were incapable of mounting either a serious political or legal 
challenge to its legitimacy. As noted, the relegation of a referendum in the UK 
constitutional order to advisory status requires the simultaneous reassertion of 
parliamentary sovereignty and a representative theory of politics. Like Schmitt, 
parliamentary sovereignty embraces democracy and the constituent power of the 
people but only because a way has been found to disarm it.177 This is evident, not just 
from the Brexit referendum but from others too, most notably the Belfast Agreement. 
Parliamentary sovereignty thus neuters what Stephen Tierney terms the ‘highly 
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imaginative and constitutionally radical’ Good Friday Agreement, glossing over the 
plurinational dimension of the UK constitutional order that it affirmed.178  
 
Acknowledging the anti-democratic basis of Parliament’s claim to the constituent 
power could potentially provide the legitimating catalyst for the UK moving towards 
a fully federal model. Parliament’s sovereignty would necessarily be curtailed; 
however, this would also give legal effect to the idea that the UK is constituted of 
individual nation states. While this is often evoked in political rhetoric, in reality, it 
has had no practical legal significance, owing to the UK’s strongly unitary 
constitutional order. Thus, Scottish constitutional lawyer JDB Mitchell’s contention 
that the UK parliament was ‘born unfree’ as it could not legislate inconsistently with 
the Treaty of Union of 1707, has fallen on deaf judicial ears.179 While the obiter dicta 
remarks of Lord Cooper in MacCormick v The Lord Advocate questioned why the 
Parliament of Great Britain should have the all characteristics of the English 
parliament with none of the characteristics of the Scottish parliament, the legal impact 
of this contention is unclear.180 As Gavin Little argues, Parliament has legislated 
inconsistently with the Act of Union on numerous occasions; moreover, courts have 
been reluctant to assume jurisdiction to review the legal validity of Acts of Parliament 
on this issue.181  
 
In addition, Scottish courts have also made clear that the Scottish Parliament’s powers 
are limited in much the same way as any other statutorily created authority exercising 
public power must stay within its statutory confines. In contrast, Westminster has 
been ‘recognised as sovereign’. A point that is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the devolution question in Miller. Little therefore concludes that despite 
some outlying judgments, the Scottish courts ‘still view parliamentary sovereignty as 
forming a key part of the rule of recognition’. Notwithstanding this, Little cautions 
against ‘the temptation to take a traditional, positivistic approach and assume that the 
debate of parliamentary sovereignty in Scotland is primarily a legal debate’.182 As 
noted, Westminster’s legal power to legislate over devolved issues has been politically 
tempered by the operation of the  Sewel convention; however, Little contends that this 
may still not be sufficient to save the legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty in 
Scotland as it does not align harmoniously with Scottish notions of popular 
sovereignty. Should the attenuation of the authority of Dicey’s theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty continue to wane, the increasing gap between the legal and 
the political could mean that its normative force attenuates also until it becomes 
effectively spent.183 Arguably the opposite has occurred, however, with claims that 
Westminster breached the Sewel convention; but this exercise of parliamentary 
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sovereignty has only served to magnify the fissure between Scottish conceptions of 
popular sovereignty and the legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
By acknowledging the distinction between constituent power and parliamentary 
sovereignty through limiting the latter, it may be possible to realise Walker’s concept 
of a developing, multi-dimensional, pluralistic and ‘metaconstitutional’ discourse 
between different levels of political and legal authority’.184 While Walker was referring 
to the EU, the same principles could be realised in a UK that is, at least rhetorically, a 
union of nations. A federalised UK could thus create the necessary points of 
constitutional friction that could reinvigorate the constitutional order, allowing 
constitutional outlets for expressions of popular will, popular wills, and, indeed 
constitutional spaces wherein those claiming to speak for the popular will can be 
contested.  At present, however, parliamentary sovereignty neutralises this possibility 
of creative constitutional conflict escalating to the degree whereby one needs to invoke 
a claim to constituent power to legitimise reform. The result is a stultifying and 
unimaginative constitutional jurisprudence where every square can be circled by 
reference back to parliamentary sovereignty. If relational constituent power is to 
unlock the flexibility and adaptability that is supposedly the hallmarks of British 
constitutional theory, a much more antagonistic relationship between the people and 
public institutions needs to be recognised. It may be better for a descriptive account 
of constituent power to be deployed to expose the anti-democratic basis of 
Parliament’s claim to the constituent power and legitimate constitutional reform that 
seeks to claim it for ‘the people’ or peoples. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 It is only through stressing the tension between the people and Parliament, 
acknowledging the monarchical and aristocratic legacies of British constituent power 
that true constitutional reform can be approached. This would necessarily entail a 
curtailment of parliamentary sovereignty, or, at the very least, a thorough 
comprehension of the institutionally-directed nature of parliamentary sovereignty 
and its weaker legitimacy vis-à-vis the people. This tension understood and 
confronted, a more stable constitutional settlement could be achieved. This does not 
mean, however, that it is up to courts to decide to invoke the concept of constituent 
power. Rather, it is not necessarily for the courts to utilise the doctrine of constituent 
power to face down parliament as this could do untold damage to the courts’ 
legitimacy. It would be highly ironic that a plea to take heed of ‘the people’ in the 
British constitutional system would result in judicial supremacy, particularly in light 
of Dicey’s claim, as endorsed by the Divisional Court in Miller that ‘judges know 
nothing about any will of the People except in so far as that will is expressed by an 
Act of Parliament’.185 However, it may take such a constitutional crisis for such change 
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to take place. Notwithstanding this, however, the simple re-assertion of parliamentary 
sovereignty in such a case would only serve to highlight the dichotomy that exists 
between Parliament and the People stressing the monarchical or, at the very least, the 
oligarchical origins and continued basis of its claim to the constituent power.  
 
Legal norms possess both factual and normative dimensions. Gaps often emerge, 
however, between theory and practice—between facts and norms. In such instances, 
theory should adapt. Parliamentary sovereignty, however, has not. With 
parliamentary sovereignty as the apex norm of the UK constitutional order, it follows 
that all British constitutional imagination and reform must not infringe upon this. The 
major constitutional reforms of the HRA, devolution, and UK membership of the EU 
all had to be designed so as not to distort this natural order. While the case can be 
made that the UK has managed to effectively accommodate these changes, the recent 
impact of referendums has illustrated not so much a flexibility but a contortion in 
order to ensure the preservation of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the need to preserve it as the apex norm of the UK constitutional 
order has stultified British constitutional evolution or, at the very least, blinded 
constitutional actors to the potential illegitimacy of their actions. As an institutionally 
directed doctrine concerned primarily at establishing its supremacy in relation to first, 
the Crown, and subsequently, the courts, the relation between Parliament and the 
people has been neglected. So too has the composition of this people. If the UK 
constitution is to overcome the current torpor, it must confront the inviolable principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty. By recognising this tension between Parliament and the 
people, and between the competing conceptions of ‘the people’ a more lasting 
constitutional settlement unbridled by the traditions of the past could be achieved.  
 
 
